A Condo on The Moon...

The manned space program heats up as NASA unveils its plans for a lunar base and finds signs of flowing water on Mars.


It's getting hard to find many Americans who remember where they were the last time men set foot on the moon. Not only had most of us quit paying attention to lunar landings by then, but 48% of us hadn't even been born by December 1972, when the last moon walkers left the lunar surface and headed for home.


But the U.S. may be bound for deep space again. In a rare double hit of good-news headlines last week, NASA announced first that it has firmed up its plans for America's return to the moon and then, two days later, that it had discovered signs that water had flowed on the surface of Mars within the past seven years. Where there is water, of course, there could be life.

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How to Avoid Iraq Syndrome



Yes, the war is a disaster. But let's not lose sight of America's global primacy
.

Not much about Iraq can be predicted with confidence, but this much can: for the foreseeable future, it will be a messy country with a weak central government, a divided society and regular violence. At worst, as the Iraq Study Group report warns, Iraq will become a failed state racked by civil war that could spill over and engulf several of its neighbors.

Either way, the human, economic, political and military costs of the Iraq war will mount. Scenes of chaos and human misery in Iraq would fuel bitterness against the U.S., first for having initiated the war, then for leaving Iraqis to their terrible fate. The domestic American reaction would be one of relief at being out of a terrible situation, but anger at having been involved in the first place and having invested so much, only to have so little to show for it.

Almost as important as what actually happens in Iraq is how it is understood. One possibility is that people around the region and the world would come to judge Iraq's failure as largely the result of American policy, the product of an ill-advised war inadequately followed up. If this is the case, Iraq would cast a cloud over the U.S. reputation for competence and reliability, and it would last for years. This scenario would create doubts in the minds of America's friends--and, correspondingly, increase the assertiveness of its foes.

An alternative view is that the lion's share of responsibility for what has taken place in Iraq over the past few years belongs to the Iraqis themselves. Under this narrative, the U.S. would be seen as having failed there less for any lack of effort or resolve than for the absence of an effective national partner. This narrative is more likely to take hold if the U.S. publicly sets clear benchmarks for what Iraqis must accomplish regarding political reform and security performance and what they should expect if they come up short.

Whichever story line prevails, the intensity of today's anti-Americanism would fade as Iraq recedes from center stage. The domestic American reaction may persist somewhat longer, however. There is the possibility of an Iraq syndrome, akin to the reaction that followed the U.S. involvement in Vietnam a generation ago. That defeat led Americans and their representatives to be wary of new overseas undertakings.

But it is important not to exaggerate the likely consequences of Iraq's endgame for the U.S. America will remain the world's most powerful country regardless of how Iraq turns out and how much U.S. foreign policy is blamed for it. The U.S. will continue to enjoy a benign international context in which it faces no great power rival, as it did throughout the cold war and as great powers have traditionally done throughout history. And ironically, the winding down of the U.S. involvement in Iraq will have a salutary effect--namely, it will slow the draw on American economic, diplomatic and military resources, all of which are in dire need of replenishment.

In fact, U.S. diplomacy will in some ways be liberated as American involvement in Iraq recedes. The U.S. could, if it so chose, be an effective proponent for Arab-Israeli peace. If the U.S. and Iran prove able to cooperate over Iraq, they might manage broader talks on other issues that divide them, including Iran's nuclear program. Outside the region, more must be done to lessen the odds that Afghanistan will go the way of Iraq. The Bush Administration could table a comprehensive package of requirements and assurances regarding North Korea and directly negotiate them with its leaders. New ideas could also be put forward about how best to resurrect international-trade talks, tackle global climate change, stop genocide in Darfur and reduce American dependence on imported oil.

Here again, the Vietnam parallel may be relevant. Defeat in Vietnam did not prevent the U.S. from maintaining close cooperative relationships with other regional countries, including Japan, South Korea and the Philippines. Nor did it stop the U.S. from forging sometimes productive ties with Vietnam's backers (including China and what was then the Soviet Union) or, with the passage of time, with Vietnam itself. Today Asia is the most dynamic part of the world, and the U.S. is a central participant in that dynamism.

Even more than Vietnam 30 years ago, Iraq constitutes a major strategic setback. There is no getting around this. But Iraq is just that--a setback. What is essential is that the U.S. cut its losses there, contain the consequences and look for new opportunities to advance its interests around the world. The sooner the post-Iraq era of U.S. foreign policy dawns, the better.

Haass is president of the Council on Foreign Relations

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Indianapolis Homeowner Shoots Intruder

A homeowner shot and killed a man who allegedly tried to rob his home.

Police say 22-year-old Mark Yant broke into a house in the 200 block of Tremont Street at about 2:00 a.m. Monday.

The owner opened fire on Yant, hitting him several times; medics took him to the hospital where he died.

Police say they will not press charges against the homeowner.

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He Will Cheat On You If His.........

Even the tiniest suspicion that her man might be unfaithful can turn some women into an investigator worthy of a guest-star role on CSI. Now, a surprising new study suggests that women with huskier mates can breathe a bit easier on this front.


Here's the scoop: When researchers surveyed 1,000 men, 23 percent of average-sized guys and 19 percent of moderately overweight men said they'd cheat on their partners if they had the chance. However, only 11 percent of very overweight men said they'd stray. "The more you weigh, the less interested you are in sexual dalliances," said men's health expert Sascha Rusch of the health institute Epicure, which commissioned the study..........

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Procreation Vacations - Good for couples or Babies?

When Lucinda Hughes heard she would have to down sea moss elixirs while vacationing in the Bahamas, she was sure it would make her sick. Three months later, Hughes is very sick - every morning - and expecting her first baby in April.


As Hughes and her husband Kemry lounged on lush beaches and swam in their hotel's infinity pool, they sipped pumpkin soup and enjoyed couple's massages and reflexology. It was all aimed at enhancing the odds of babymaking during their three-day Procreation Vacation at The Westin at Our Lucaya Grand Bahama Island.


It's part of the latest trend that has hotels around the world luring conception-minded couples by providing everything from onsite sex doctors to age-old fertility boosters promised to hasten the pitter-patter of little feet.

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American General Kicked Out of Iraq

In an interview with Time.com, Lt. Gen. Peter Chiarelli, the man in charge of combat operations in Iraq, reflects on the troubled mission,


Lt. Gen. Peter W. Chiarelli's two tours of duty in Iraq have coincided with some of the worst violence the country has experienced since the fall of Saddam Hussein. As commander of the 1st Cavalry, Chiarelli experienced the first spasm of the Shi'ite revolt when, in the summer of 2004, Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahri Army fought pitched battles against U.S. forces in Baghdad and Najaf. But the main vector of violence in Iraq was the Sunni insurgency, supported by foreign jihadis.


Chiarelli returned to Iraq last January as commander of the Multinational Corps รข€” in layman's terms, the general in charge of combat operations. Within weeks the Shi'ites were up in arms again, after the bombing of the al-Ashkari Shrine in Samarra. This time, the target of their rage was the Sunni community, not U.S. forces. Shi'ite militias are blamed for much of the killings in Iraq's civil war.

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Iran Reacts Favorably to the Baker-Hamilton Plan




While the White House remains wary of the proposal to talk with Iran, Tehran sources tell TIME that the regime believes such talks are in the country's best interest.

The Iranian government has responded more positively than the Bush Administration has to the Iraq Study Group's proposal for talks between the two. And government sources in Tehran tell TIME that this reflects a sincere and calculated desire among the Iranian leadership for improved relations with Washington.

Responding to the Baker-Hamilton report's proposal that Washington move quickly to engage Iran on talks over stabilizing Iraq, Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki dangled an offer of cooperation in a statement published by an Iranian news agency. "Iran will support any policies returning security, stability and territorial integrity to Iraq," he said, "and considers withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq and leaving security to the Iraqi government as the most suitable option." In an interview on Al Jazeera, Mottaki added that if the U.S. needs an "honorable way out of Iraq," and Iran "is in a position to help."

President Bush, by contrast, appeared to rebuff the suggestion, insisting that Iran would have to suspend its uranium-enrichment program before it could talk to the U.S. about Iraq. And the response from many U.S. lawmakers questioning Iran's motives in Iraq underscored the continued taboo in Washington over dealing openly with the Islamic Republic.

Three Iranian sources — a government official and two figures close to government policymakers — tell TIME that Mottaki's statement is reflective of a solid consensus among the regime's foreign-policy decision makers that restoring relations with the U.S. is in Iran's best interests. "If tomorrow the U.S. seriously — and I emphasize the word seriously — tried to engage Iran, in a way that accepted the 1979 Iranian revolution and engaged Iran in a respectful atmosphere, then Iran would welcome the chance to address mutual concerns," said one of the sources, a prominent expert on U.S.-Iranian relations.

TIME's sources offered a glimpse into the internal Iranian debate on the issue, which involves Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the Supreme National Security Council headed by Ali Larijani, as well as other senior Iranian officials. While radical elements inside the regime remain adamantly opposed to dealing with the "Great Satan," the sources said, a strong consensus has nonetheless developed among Iran's ruling conservatives in favor of talks with the U.S. The basis of this consensus is a belief that improved relations with the U.S. would serve Iranian interests on a variety of fronts, including Iraq, Afghanistan, oil production, foreign investment and Iran's nuclear energy program. Iran's definition of talks, the sources emphasize, is not simply an American harangue about Iran's policies, but discussions that include Iranian concerns about the U.S., including sanctions, frozen Iranian assets, future American military plans for the region and Washington's support for anti-government groups.

Some Iranian leaders and officials, including President Ahmadinejad, also believe that Iran now has the opportunity to deal with Washington from a position of strength, for the first time since the 1979 revolution. The sources say that this assessment is based on a perception that the U.S. is stuck in quagmires in Iraq and Afghanistan, while Iran's influence in the region and throughout the Muslim world is expanding. These officials see further evidence of Iran's advantage in the difficulties the U.S. continues to encounter in winning support for U.N. tough sanctions over Iran's nuclear program. The sources say that Iranian officials believe that to open a serious dialogue with the U.S. in these circumstances would significantly enhance Iran's international prestige and regional influence.

Iran is also increasingly concerned about the need to stabilize Iraq, say TIME's sources, in contrast to U.S. charges that Tehran is fueling instability there. The sources indicate that Iranian officials essentially agree with the Baker-Hamilton conclusion that while Iran gains an advantage from having the U.S. mired in Iraq, its long-term interests are not served by Iraqi chaos and territorial disintegration. "Iran would love to see the situation stabilized in Iraq," says a source. "That is a very important concern for Iran. But Iran doesn't want to see the U.S. declare victory, in case the Americans would like to attack Iran next." The sources say that among the ways Iran could be helpful is to try to persuade groups representing the Shi'ite majority and Kurds in Iraq to be more conciliatory to the Sunni minority whose grievances fuel the insurgency.

As evidence of Iran's readiness, the sources say, Larijani earlier this year publicly accepted an offer made by U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad to hold talks with Iranian officials in Baghdad. But in Iran's view, the U.S. withdrew the offer and that undercut Larijani's standing inside the regime, strengthening the position of more hard-line elements, including Ahmadinejad. "It was a missed opportunity," contends the expert on U.S.-Iranian relations.

And, in light of the debates that continue to swirl both in Tehran and Washington over whether to talk to each other, it may not have been the last one.

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Today in history - Dec. 10

Today is Sunday, Dec. 10, the 344th day of 2006. There are 21 days left in the year.


Today's Highlight in History:


One hundred years ago, on Dec. 10, 1906, President Theodore Roosevelt became the first American to be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, for helping to mediate an end to the Russo-Japanese War.


On this date:


In 1817, Mississippi was admitted as the 20th state.


In 1869, women were granted the right to vote in the Wyoming Territory.


In 1896, Alfred Nobel, the inventor of dynamite and founder of the Nobel prizes, died in San Remo, Italy, at age 63.

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A General Returns From Iraq: "I Don't Feel Like I'm Leaving on a High Note"




In an interview with Time.com, Lt. Gen. Peter Chiarelli, the man in charge of combat operations in Iraq, reflects on the troubled mission,

Lt. Gen. Peter W. Chiarelli's two tours of duty in Iraq have coincided with some of the worst violence the country has experienced since the fall of Saddam Hussein. As commander of the 1st Cavalry, Chiarelli experienced the first spasm of the Shi'ite revolt when, in the summer of 2004, Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahri Army fought pitched battles against U.S. forces in Baghdad and Najaf. But the main vector of violence in Iraq was the Sunni insurgency, supported by foreign jihadis.

Chiarelli returned to Iraq last January as commander of the Multinational Corps — in layman's terms, the general in charge of combat operations. Within weeks the Shi'ites were up in arms again, after the bombing of the al-Ashkari Shrine in Samarra. This time, the target of their rage was the Sunni community, not U.S. forces. Shi'ite militias are blamed for much of the killings in Iraq's civil war.

As Chiarelli gets ready to hand over Lt. Gen. Raymond Odierno this month, there's some buzz at the Pentagon that he may return for a third tour, to replace Gen. George Casey as the top commanding general in Iraq. A few days before he began to pack his bags, Chiarelli shared his views on Iraq with TIME's Aparisim Ghosh. Exerpts from the interview:

Q. This is your second departure from Iraq. How different does it feel from the previous one?

A. The last time, I felt I was leaving on a high note. After a very difficult year, we were able to hold Iraq's first free elections [on Jan 30, 2005] just before I left. I don't feel like I'm leaving on a high note this time. The sectarian killing — that's the hard part.

Q. There have been rumors in Washington that you may replace Gen. Casey when his tour ends.

A. I don't know about that. I'd like to see this job through to the end — let's leave it at that.

Q. What have been the seminal moments of your tour — moments when you thought, "This changes the battlefield"?

A.The bombing of the Golden Mosque [the Ashkariya Shrine in Samarra] in February — that changed everything. That was the most seminal moment of my entire two years here. That probably surpassed the elections in having an effect on the people. That's where we saw the rise in sectarian violence. There were other moments, like the delay in forming the government [after the Dec, 2005 elections]. We didn't have a government until June. That created a real angst in the community, as they watched this process play out. And it allowed the militias to grow without interference.

Q. What will you miss most about Iraq?

A. Being around soldiers in a fight.

Q: What will you miss least?

A: Writing condolence letter to the families of dead soldiers.

Q: How many have you written as MNC-I commander?

A: [Consults a diary] As of two days ago, 606.

Q: And as 1st Cav commander?

A: [Replies from memory] 169.

Q. Back then, your main fight against the Shi'ite militias was in Najaf.

A. No. Sadr City was a cauldron from August through October ['04]. The problem was pushed to the side because everything was building toward the operation [against Sunni insurgents] in Fallujah and the fight [against the Mahdi Army] in Najaf. Sadr City was constant problem at that time, but everyone was looking at the big fight in Fallujah.

I think the end of the fighting in Najaf was in some ways the impetus for many of the problems we're having today. That's when al-Sadr decided to join the political process. But that's also when the rogue militias really got started, because [some of al-Sadr's supporters] said, 'No we're not going to do that.'

We thought the hardest thing was holding the election. But that's relatively easy, compared to trying to get a government started — people setting up a democratic government for the first time, trying to work through everything you have to work through.

Q. Were you surprised by how hard that was, by how long that took?

A. Everyone was surprised by how long it took to form the government. And I think most people agree [the post-election political impasse] caused the militias to grow at the time. Q. You use the word "rogues" to describe some of the militias. But just how rogue are they? How much control does al-Sadr have over somebody like Abu Deraa, the militia leader in Sadr City?

A. That's the $64,000 question that we'd all like to know: how much control does Sadr have on the rogues?

Q. With the militias — is there any kinetic component to dealing with them, or is it all political?

A. At this stage right now, it is political. But that could change.

Q. How would you know when it's changed?

A. I think the PM will tell us when that has to change. If he is not able to work through some kind of a political solution, over time.

Q. You can see a political deal is struck and these people drop their guns and go home?

A. Right now, I have to believe that's the case. There can be no solution to Iraq's problems without tackling the militias. And this has to happen soon. We had a chance to tackle the militias in '04 [after a U.S. crackdown against the Mahdi Army], but then people were so happy Moqtada al-Sadr agreed to join the political process that they never forced his militia to disarm.

Q. What improvements have you seen on your second tour?

A. At the end of 2004, the Iraqi Army was nowhere near what it is right now. [Progress] has been really phenomenal. Now, we have some issues in certain units. The ability of the army to get better is somewhat retarded right now because [the Iraqi government] doesn't have the systems in place to move supplies to units in all parts of the country.

We've accomplished a lot, but there are still some serious issues — to deny that would be foolish. The [Jan 30, 2005] elections, we thought, were a strategic victory for everybody. It was hard to leave then, too, because you wanted to stay and see what you can make of what was a tremendous advancement on that particular day.

At the same time, it is the root of many of our problems today. The Sunnis didn't vote in the numbers they could have in many locations — out west, Baghdad, Diyala. In Diyala you have a predominantly Sunni population, but because they didn't vote, the provincial government is all Shi'ite. So you have the problems of a majority of Sunnis that are governed by Shi'ites for almost two years. That's why holding provincial elections is important, and hopefully that will happen by the middle of next year.

Q. There's been some talk in Washington about sending more troops to Iraq — about a "surge" before starting the withdrawal. Would you have liked to have had 20,000-30,000 more soldiers.

A. I agree with Gen. Abizaid. I think [additional troops] could have an immediate impact, for a short period of time. But past that, I just don't see where it gets you anywhere. I don't know how many troops you would have to have to stop the sectarian violence you're seeing in Baghdad and up in Diyala. I don't necessarily think troops are the answer. For me, the real answer to the problems we have right now is for the government to be perceived as the government of national unity by its people. Not by us — it doesn't matter what we think. And that will provide us more security than any number of troops can provide us.

Q. Is it too late for the government to change people's perceptions?

A. I don't think it's too late in any way whatsoever. The Prime Minister has tried. It's a complicated situation, many political parties. And he's going to have to work his way through that. He understands as much as we understand that this is a political as much as a kinetic solution.

Q. But Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki himself seems to have a credibility problem.

A. I'm not going to say whether that's correct or not. There are problems in the Sunni neighbourhoods. The perception is that they are not getting what their Shi'ite bretheren is getting. Most of what has occurred is slanted toward the Shi'ites. Their perception is that it's not a government of national unity. That's a real issue, with many of the ministries. That has to be fixed.

Q. Is that something the U.S. can do?

A. It's something the government has got to work out. I think we can help. Q. If you had 20,000-30,00 more troops, where would you put them?

A. That's operational. I can't go into that. Baghdad is our main effort, there's no doubt about it. You see what's occurred in the press. I believe there's great progress that's happened in the west. Our strategy in the west is doing exactly what we wanted it to do.

There gets a point — given the amount of time that we've been here, number of forces we've had on the ground — when the addition of additional forces can be counter-productive. It can only further embed in people's mind that we're an occupation force, with no intention of leaving. It's critical, given this culture — very different from Western culture. I don't think Americans understand how that impacts on every decision that's made and every time a soldier takes an action.

Q. Recently, there have been reports about the Pentagon examining several options for Iraq — scenarios dubbed 'Go Long,' 'Go Hard,' and 'Go Home.' Which of them makes most sense for you as a field commander?

A. That's something that's worked back in D.C. I don't think that's something for me to comment on. We're working on our own portions of a plan, and I provide information to Gen. Casey on an operational level. I believe in the mission. It is what it is, and it is not going to lend itself to a timetable. It's just not. I personally would have see whether a timetable causes us to take actions on the ground that we know to be ill-advised.

Q For instance?

Oh, any number of actions. For instance, the reduction of the number of troops we have based on a date on the calendar. I just can't see how that would be the right thing to do. I think that has to be conditions based, not time based.

Q. Some politicians in Washington have suggested that the U.S. should start withdrawing troops in four to six months.

A. I'm a fan of being able to start withdrawing within one or two months — when conditions on the ground allow it.

Q Is it fair to say we're nowhere near there yet, that the conditions now don't allow for a withdrawal within four to six months?

A. We could, if we could get some support from the political lines, the governance lines; if we can get some movement towards [sectarian] reconciliation; if we can have some sort of militia policy — if the Prime Minister can make a breakthrough there. I think that could have the effect of us having 40,000 troops deployed here.

Q. What would be the consequences of the U.S. getting it wrong in Iraq?

A. This is absolutely critical, for Iraq, the region, the U.S., that some form some form of democratic government is created, that some form of free market. It needs to be what the Iraqis want, but at the same time it is critical that in a broad sense it be considered a democracy.

I think it's essential Iraq remain a state, and not be split. Because that would allow al-Qaeda to do whatever they want, particularly in what may be called Sunnistan — to declare a caliphate from where terrorists may be launched at other targets. There is no doubt in my mind that is what al-Qaeda would like. They want a foothold in this country.

Q. How much Iraq's efforts to rebuild itself is compromised by the fact that there's an exodus of the best and brightest — Iraqis are leaving their country in the thousands.

One of the reasons they are leaving is because they don't have [economic] opportunities. So we need to create those opportunities, to stop the haemorrhaging.

This is the part of the conflict that has just been so misunderstood by the American people. There's a belief that [we have] a defined enemy out there, and once you either put those folks in jail or you kill them, the fighting it will just stop. And that's just not the case.

This is unlike any other conflict we have been involved with in the history of our country. I honestly believe that. There is not a defined enemy. The kinetic line — the security line of operations — is absolutely essential. But to think that the security line alone is going to bring peace to Iraq, is going to solve the problems you see manifested in the streets of Iraq today, is absolutely foolhardy. It can't deliver that. It cannot deliver that and stay true to the democratic ideals of our nations, because it would literally take a police state. And the democratic ideals that Iraqis voted into their constitution.

It will take a combination of kinetic and non-kinetic lines that deliver at the same time in order get a leg up on this thing. To get people to believe that life is going to get better.

Q. What advice would you give your successor, Gen. Odierno?

A. I'd say, "Work all the lines of operation at the same time, not just the security line." The security line alone is not going to solve the problem.

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