In an interview with Time.com, Lt. Gen. Peter Chiarelli, the man in charge of combat operations in Iraq, reflects on the troubled mission,
Lt. Gen. Peter W. Chiarelli's two tours of duty in Iraq have coincided with some of the worst violence the country has experienced since the fall of Saddam Hussein. As commander of the 1st Cavalry, Chiarelli experienced the first spasm of the Shi'ite revolt when, in the summer of 2004, Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahri Army fought pitched battles against U.S. forces in Baghdad and Najaf. But the main vector of violence in Iraq was the Sunni insurgency, supported by foreign jihadis.
Chiarelli returned to Iraq last January as commander of the Multinational Corps — in layman's terms, the general in charge of combat operations. Within weeks the Shi'ites were up in arms again, after the bombing of the al-Ashkari Shrine in Samarra. This time, the target of their rage was the Sunni community, not U.S. forces. Shi'ite militias are blamed for much of the killings in Iraq's civil war.
As Chiarelli gets ready to hand over Lt. Gen. Raymond Odierno this month, there's some buzz at the Pentagon that he may return for a third tour, to replace Gen. George Casey as the top commanding general in Iraq. A few days before he began to pack his bags, Chiarelli shared his views on Iraq with TIME's Aparisim Ghosh. Exerpts from the interview:
Q. This is your second departure from Iraq. How different does it feel from the previous one?
A. The last time, I felt I was leaving on a high note. After a very difficult year, we were able to hold Iraq's first free elections [on Jan 30, 2005] just before I left. I don't feel like I'm leaving on a high note this time. The sectarian killing — that's the hard part.
Q. There have been rumors in Washington that you may replace Gen. Casey when his tour ends.
A. I don't know about that. I'd like to see this job through to the end — let's leave it at that.
Q. What have been the seminal moments of your tour — moments when you thought, "This changes the battlefield"?
A.The bombing of the Golden Mosque [the Ashkariya Shrine in Samarra] in February — that changed everything. That was the most seminal moment of my entire two years here. That probably surpassed the elections in having an effect on the people. That's where we saw the rise in sectarian violence. There were other moments, like the delay in forming the government [after the Dec, 2005 elections]. We didn't have a government until June. That created a real angst in the community, as they watched this process play out. And it allowed the militias to grow without interference.
Q. What will you miss most about Iraq?
A. Being around soldiers in a fight.
Q: What will you miss least?
A: Writing condolence letter to the families of dead soldiers.
Q: How many have you written as MNC-I commander?
A: [Consults a diary] As of two days ago, 606.
Q: And as 1st Cav commander?
A: [Replies from memory] 169.
Q. Back then, your main fight against the Shi'ite militias was in Najaf.
A. No. Sadr City was a cauldron from August through October ['04]. The problem was pushed to the side because everything was building toward the operation [against Sunni insurgents] in Fallujah and the fight [against the Mahdi Army] in Najaf. Sadr City was constant problem at that time, but everyone was looking at the big fight in Fallujah.
I think the end of the fighting in Najaf was in some ways the impetus for many of the problems we're having today. That's when al-Sadr decided to join the political process. But that's also when the rogue militias really got started, because [some of al-Sadr's supporters] said, 'No we're not going to do that.'
We thought the hardest thing was holding the election. But that's relatively easy, compared to trying to get a government started — people setting up a democratic government for the first time, trying to work through everything you have to work through.
Q. Were you surprised by how hard that was, by how long that took?
A. Everyone was surprised by how long it took to form the government. And I think most people agree [the post-election political impasse] caused the militias to grow at the time. Q. You use the word "rogues" to describe some of the militias. But just how rogue are they? How much control does al-Sadr have over somebody like Abu Deraa, the militia leader in Sadr City?
A. That's the $64,000 question that we'd all like to know: how much control does Sadr have on the rogues?
Q. With the militias — is there any kinetic component to dealing with them, or is it all political?
A. At this stage right now, it is political. But that could change.
Q. How would you know when it's changed?
A. I think the PM will tell us when that has to change. If he is not able to work through some kind of a political solution, over time.
Q. You can see a political deal is struck and these people drop their guns and go home?
A. Right now, I have to believe that's the case. There can be no solution to Iraq's problems without tackling the militias. And this has to happen soon. We had a chance to tackle the militias in '04 [after a U.S. crackdown against the Mahdi Army], but then people were so happy Moqtada al-Sadr agreed to join the political process that they never forced his militia to disarm.
Q. What improvements have you seen on your second tour?
A. At the end of 2004, the Iraqi Army was nowhere near what it is right now. [Progress] has been really phenomenal. Now, we have some issues in certain units. The ability of the army to get better is somewhat retarded right now because [the Iraqi government] doesn't have the systems in place to move supplies to units in all parts of the country.
We've accomplished a lot, but there are still some serious issues — to deny that would be foolish. The [Jan 30, 2005] elections, we thought, were a strategic victory for everybody. It was hard to leave then, too, because you wanted to stay and see what you can make of what was a tremendous advancement on that particular day.
At the same time, it is the root of many of our problems today. The Sunnis didn't vote in the numbers they could have in many locations — out west, Baghdad, Diyala. In Diyala you have a predominantly Sunni population, but because they didn't vote, the provincial government is all Shi'ite. So you have the problems of a majority of Sunnis that are governed by Shi'ites for almost two years. That's why holding provincial elections is important, and hopefully that will happen by the middle of next year.
Q. There's been some talk in Washington about sending more troops to Iraq — about a "surge" before starting the withdrawal. Would you have liked to have had 20,000-30,000 more soldiers.
A. I agree with Gen. Abizaid. I think [additional troops] could have an immediate impact, for a short period of time. But past that, I just don't see where it gets you anywhere. I don't know how many troops you would have to have to stop the sectarian violence you're seeing in Baghdad and up in Diyala. I don't necessarily think troops are the answer. For me, the real answer to the problems we have right now is for the government to be perceived as the government of national unity by its people. Not by us — it doesn't matter what we think. And that will provide us more security than any number of troops can provide us.
Q. Is it too late for the government to change people's perceptions?
A. I don't think it's too late in any way whatsoever. The Prime Minister has tried. It's a complicated situation, many political parties. And he's going to have to work his way through that. He understands as much as we understand that this is a political as much as a kinetic solution.
Q. But Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki himself seems to have a credibility problem.
A. I'm not going to say whether that's correct or not. There are problems in the Sunni neighbourhoods. The perception is that they are not getting what their Shi'ite bretheren is getting. Most of what has occurred is slanted toward the Shi'ites. Their perception is that it's not a government of national unity. That's a real issue, with many of the ministries. That has to be fixed.
Q. Is that something the U.S. can do?
A. It's something the government has got to work out. I think we can help. Q. If you had 20,000-30,00 more troops, where would you put them?
A. That's operational. I can't go into that. Baghdad is our main effort, there's no doubt about it. You see what's occurred in the press. I believe there's great progress that's happened in the west. Our strategy in the west is doing exactly what we wanted it to do.
There gets a point — given the amount of time that we've been here, number of forces we've had on the ground — when the addition of additional forces can be counter-productive. It can only further embed in people's mind that we're an occupation force, with no intention of leaving. It's critical, given this culture — very different from Western culture. I don't think Americans understand how that impacts on every decision that's made and every time a soldier takes an action.
Q. Recently, there have been reports about the Pentagon examining several options for Iraq — scenarios dubbed 'Go Long,' 'Go Hard,' and 'Go Home.' Which of them makes most sense for you as a field commander?
A. That's something that's worked back in D.C. I don't think that's something for me to comment on. We're working on our own portions of a plan, and I provide information to Gen. Casey on an operational level. I believe in the mission. It is what it is, and it is not going to lend itself to a timetable. It's just not. I personally would have see whether a timetable causes us to take actions on the ground that we know to be ill-advised.
Q For instance?
Oh, any number of actions. For instance, the reduction of the number of troops we have based on a date on the calendar. I just can't see how that would be the right thing to do. I think that has to be conditions based, not time based.
Q. Some politicians in Washington have suggested that the U.S. should start withdrawing troops in four to six months.
A. I'm a fan of being able to start withdrawing within one or two months — when conditions on the ground allow it.
Q Is it fair to say we're nowhere near there yet, that the conditions now don't allow for a withdrawal within four to six months?
A. We could, if we could get some support from the political lines, the governance lines; if we can get some movement towards [sectarian] reconciliation; if we can have some sort of militia policy — if the Prime Minister can make a breakthrough there. I think that could have the effect of us having 40,000 troops deployed here.
Q. What would be the consequences of the U.S. getting it wrong in Iraq?
A. This is absolutely critical, for Iraq, the region, the U.S., that some form some form of democratic government is created, that some form of free market. It needs to be what the Iraqis want, but at the same time it is critical that in a broad sense it be considered a democracy.
I think it's essential Iraq remain a state, and not be split. Because that would allow al-Qaeda to do whatever they want, particularly in what may be called Sunnistan — to declare a caliphate from where terrorists may be launched at other targets. There is no doubt in my mind that is what al-Qaeda would like. They want a foothold in this country.
Q. How much Iraq's efforts to rebuild itself is compromised by the fact that there's an exodus of the best and brightest — Iraqis are leaving their country in the thousands.
One of the reasons they are leaving is because they don't have [economic] opportunities. So we need to create those opportunities, to stop the haemorrhaging.
This is the part of the conflict that has just been so misunderstood by the American people. There's a belief that [we have] a defined enemy out there, and once you either put those folks in jail or you kill them, the fighting it will just stop. And that's just not the case.
This is unlike any other conflict we have been involved with in the history of our country. I honestly believe that. There is not a defined enemy. The kinetic line — the security line of operations — is absolutely essential. But to think that the security line alone is going to bring peace to Iraq, is going to solve the problems you see manifested in the streets of Iraq today, is absolutely foolhardy. It can't deliver that. It cannot deliver that and stay true to the democratic ideals of our nations, because it would literally take a police state. And the democratic ideals that Iraqis voted into their constitution.
It will take a combination of kinetic and non-kinetic lines that deliver at the same time in order get a leg up on this thing. To get people to believe that life is going to get better.
Q. What advice would you give your successor, Gen. Odierno?
A. I'd say, "Work all the lines of operation at the same time, not just the security line." The security line alone is not going to solve the problem.
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